A Question of Consumption? An Analysis of the Relative Effectiveness of Multilateral and Bilateral Aid Receipts by Zornow, Oliver
Undergraduate Economic Review
Volume 7 | Issue 1 Article 12
2011
A Question of Consumption? An Analysis of the
Relative Effectiveness of Multilateral and Bilateral
Aid Receipts
Oliver Zornow
Lawrence University, ozornow@gmail.com
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon Center for Curricular and Faculty
Development, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU by
the faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Zornow, Oliver (2011) "A Question of Consumption? An Analysis of the Relative Effectiveness of Multilateral and Bilateral
Aid Receipts," Undergraduate Economic Review: Vol. 7: Iss. 1, Article 12.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol7/iss1/12
A Question of Consumption? An Analysis of the Relative Effectiveness of
Multilateral and Bilateral Aid Receipts
Abstract
The literature focusing on the effects of foreign aid on economic growth contains a wide range of conclusions.
Despite this lack of consensus, policy makers have been strongly influenced by the work of Burnside and
Dollar (2000) (B&D). In addition to their primary conclusion that total aid is linked with growth in a good
policy environment, B&D make a claim which is not directly supported by their results. My research is
motivated by their claim that multilateral aid is the most effective form of aid. This paper demonstrates that
B&D's data does not support this claim.
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Over the past several decades, foreign aid has attracted a great deal
of controversy both in the popular press and in academia. One important
piece of this controversy has been the extraordinarily influential work by
Craig Burnside and David Dollar (2000) (B&D). Their results have been
hailed as evidence that, under the right conditions, aid can have a positive
effect on GDP growth. As such, their results have been broadly cited as
evidence supporting increasing flows of foreign aid through organizations
like the World Bank.
In their paper, B&D address two, related questions. The first is whether
or not aid has a positive effect on growth in a good policy environment and
the second is if this good policy environment attracts foreign aid. Through
the use of a policy index and interaction terms in their regression equations,
B&D demonstrate that aid does have a significantly positive effect on GDP
growth. In addition, they find that multilateral, as opposed to bilateral, aid
is positively correlated with these good policies. As such, the resounding
policy implication is that aid will be most effective in the presence of a
good policy environment, and the most effective way to distribute this aid
is through multilateral aid organizations. B&D even pose the hypothesis
that the overall lack of correlation between aid and growth is the result of a
glut of bilateral aid. Beyond the lack of a relationship between bilateral aid
and good policies, they demonstrate that bilateral aid is prone to increased
government consumption rather than investment.1 While this conclusion
is valid in light of the assumption that multilateral aid, if not used for
consumption, is invested, and that this investment would encourage long-
run GDP growth, they fail to directly support this claim. Rather, they rely
on a number of assumptions to support their round-about reasoning.
To better test the relationship between multilateral aid and growth, it is
also necessary to call into question another of Burnside and Dollar‘s assump-
1It is important to note that there is not a single, unique method for determining what
spending is included as government consumption
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tions. The specification used by B&D combines multilateral and bilateral
aid into one regressor–total aid. Implicitly, B&D assume that the coeffi-
cient on bilateral aid and the coefficient on multilateral aid are equal. While
this assumption has been prominent throughout the aid/growth literature,
it is not consistant with the underlying policy claim that one type of aid is
fundamentally better than the other at producing GDP growth.
After reviewing the relevant literature and briefly reviewing the motiva-
tion, data, and model used for this research, I present results which directly
contrast with this claim that multilateral aid is ceteris paribus more effec-
tive than bilateral aid at encouraging GDP growth. When B&D‘s model is
altered to allow for separate values for the coefficients on multilateral and
bilateral aid, it becomes apparent that not only does multilateral aid not
outperform bilateral aid, but it actually has a negative effect on growth.
While further research is needed to cement the implications of these results,
they clearly show that this claim is not supported by the data presented by
B&D.
It is important to make clear that my research’s contribution is not to
call into question B&D‘s general conclusions. Rather, this research specifi-
cally criticizes this secondary claim by demonstrating that not only is there
evidence to reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on bilateral aid is less
than the coefficient on multilateral aid, but also ample reason to doubt that
multilateral aid has a positive effect on GDP per capita growth.
1 Related Literature
The literature on aid effectiveness has been described as a battlefield, with
conflicting results and theoretical traps leading the conclusions of some of the
best papers to be questioned (Fielding and Knowles 2007). A good sense of
this conflict is demonstrated by Henrick Hansen and Fin Tarp (2000). They
provide an overview of the evolution in the aid effectiveness literature since
2
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the 1960s. In this review, Hansen and Tarp identify three phases in the
development of the aid effectiveness literature. The first phase included the
theoretical foundation and early empirics; the second primarily focused on
the effect that aid has on investment; and the third is characterized by non-
linear regressions of economic growth on aid. In the first two phases, authors
were troubled by specification error and results difficult to interpret–as the
theory would justify both negative and positive correlation between savings
and aid as effective.
The most recent wave of the aid/growth literature draws its roots from
the work of scholars like Craig Burnside and David Dollar (2000) and Pe-
ter Boone (1996). These studies utilize equations which incorporated a
non-linear relationship between aid and growth. Despite the similarity, the
conclusions of these two papers stand in opposition to each other.
Boone’s research focused on the use of aid by different political/economic
regimes. Boone distinguishes among three types of regimes (egalitarian,
elitist, and laisez-faire) and attempts to identify how each of these regimes
utilize the aid their countries receive. In his research, he finds no significant
difference in the handling of aid and that this aid does not significantly
increase either investment/growth or benefit the poor. His only caveat is
that in liberal democracies, it appears that the poor have slightly greater
access to social services, but this is not increased as a result of aid. No
matter the regime, Boone finds that the vast majority of aid receipts end
up being distributed for the benefit of the politically powerful within the
developing countries.
Burnside and Dollars primary innovation is the inclusion of an aid in-
teracted with policy variable in their regressions. B&D experiment with
both quadratic and non-quadratic interaction terms. The main conclusion
of their paper is that there is a significant, positive relationship between aid
and growth (in a good policy environment). In addition, they found that
3
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good policies are able to attract multilateral aid, but have little effect on
bilateral aid.
The results shown by Burnside and Dollar sparked a renewed policy
discussion and, as would be expected, a flurry of scholarly comments and
critiques. A few articles are particularly relevant to this discussion. One
example is the work by Carl-Johan Dalgaard, Henrik Hansen, and Finn Tarp
(2002). These authors respond to both Boone and B&D. Dalgaard, Hansen,
and Tarp conclude that, contrary to the results of Boone and B&D, aid does
positively affect growth no matter the policy environment. By surveying a
vast range of empirical literature, these three authors find problems with
the models, specification, and conclusions of the few papers with results
that indicate a negative relationship.
In their comment on the work of B&D, David Fielding and Stephen
Knowles (2007) argue that there are serious theoretical concerns with the
method being used in the modern aid effectiveness literature. They argue
that the growth theory does not indicate a non-linear starting point for
these models (as is incorporated through the aid× policy and aid2 × policy
variables). This is especially true of the aid× policy variable used by B&D
which may simply derive its significant coefficient from other non-linearities
within the observed relationship. Fielding and Knowles argue that if such
non-linearities do exist, that the model should be able to use both aid as a
proportion of GDP as well as aid per capita and produce consistent results.
William Easterly is one of the most adamant critics of the conclusions
drawn from the work of B&D. The heart of Easterly’s dissent is the al-
most immediate acceptance and implementation of B&D’s results, without
the benefit of further studies to test their robustness. In a response with
Ross Levine and David Roodman (2004), Easterly demonstrates that in fact
these results are not robust to variation in time. In yet another article, East-
erly (2003) demonstrates that the B&D results are also contingent on their
4
4
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 7 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 12
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol7/iss1/12
specific definition of aid and policy. In addition to these two comments
on sensitivity to time period, variations on aid definitions, there have been
criticisms of the specification used by B&D (Collier and Dehn 2001). This
sensitivity of results has been demonstrated across the aid/growth literature
(Roodman 2007).
Burnside and Dollar have responded directly to Easterly, et. al’s attack
in Burnside and Dollar (2004a). In addition, they respond to a number of
their other critics, as well as reassert their claim that aid has a positive effect
on growth in a good policy environment (Burnside and Dollar 2004b).
While unnecessary to summarize here, it is also important to understand
that a vast literature exists on this and related questions beyond those di-
rectly addressing the work by B&D. Specifically, work on the motivations
and impact of multilateral donors (Reynaud and Vauday (2009), Harrigan,
Wang, and El-Said (2006), Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2005), and Easterly
(2005)) and bilateral donors(Fleck and Kilby (2010), Balla and Reinhardt
(2008), Birdsall, Claessens, and Diwan (2003)) as well as comparisons be-
tween the two (Dollar and Levin 2006). The standard procedure for defining
aid effectiveness in terms of GDP growth has been challanged by many as
showing an incomplete picture as to the impacts that foreign aid has in
the developing world (de Ree and Nillesen (2009), Dreher, Nunnenkamp,
and Thiele (2008), Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005), and
Kosack (2003)). In addition, alternative variables have been argued to im-
pact the ability for aid to impact growth within a country including level of
colonization (Angeles and Neanidis 2009), aid predictability (Arellano, Bu-
lir, Lane, and Lipschitz 2009), corruption (Rajkumar and Swaroop 2008),
exogenous shocks (Raddatz 2007), and aid conditionality (Svensson 2003).
5
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2 Motivation, Data, & Model
The driving force behind this paper is the belief indicated by B&D that
their result of “no significant tendency for total aid or bilateral aid to fa-
vor good policy[and] that bilateral aid is strongly positively correlated with
government consumption, may help to explain why the impact of foreign aid
on growth is not more broadly positive” (Burnside and Dollar 864). The
resulting policy proposal is that to encourage growth, more aid should be
given multilaterally (based on good policies), rather than bilaterally. This is
the conclusion that has, arguably, had the greatest impact on policy makers
over the past decade.
Despite the already discussed problems of robustness, this claim is not
even directly supported by B&D’s data. They base it on their results that
bilateral aid is not only associated with greater consumption (not invest-
ment) but also is not correlated with good policies of the recipient country.
Conversely, they find that good policies have a significant, positive correla-
tion with multilateral aid in general, as well as aid which is given specifically
by the World Bank
Both of the assumptions implicit to this argument–(1) that aid (at least
the multilateral variety) leads to investment and (2) investment leads to
growth–have been demonstrated to be highly questionable (Easterly 2001).
Despite this, the basic model (built off of the financing gap theories pop-
ular in the mid-twentieth century) is what has continued to prevail in the
policy world. It is precisely the lack of a clear, alternative explanation in
academia that has allowed this approach to continue. The literature has
not adequately addressed this question precisely because of the types of
round about methods used by B&D which leave no room to challenge these
assumptions.
While this paper is not the first to do so, one of the contributions is
to further strengthen the rationale for distinguishing between the various
6
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types of aid within the regression equation. This is especially the case when
arguing that the motive, implementation, and effect of these various forms
of foreign aid are dramatically different. This method of using regressors
for each aid type has been shown to be technically sound (Ratti Ram 2003),
and, as this paper will demonstrate, calls into question some of the basic
assumptions that much of the aid literature is built on.
Despite this shared logical strand, my work is differentiated by remaining
committed to the same basic specification as B&D. The only deviation in my
model is the separation of the two aid regressors–multilateral and bilateral.
2.1 Data, Model, and Variables
To illustrate this point most clearly, I turn to the same set of panel data
covering 56 middle- and low-income countries over six, four-year periods
from 1970-1973 to 1990-1993 provided by Burnside and Dollar. In addition
to their initial specification and sample, I will demonstrate that my results
are robust to all of their various specifications including a sample restricted
to low-income countries (46 countries using their definition of initial per
capital GDP of $1,000 or less) as well as the exclusion of outliers.
One of the implicit assumptions of not only the specification used in
Burnside and Dollar (2000) but also the vast majority of the aid/growth
literature is that the coefficients on the various types of aid are equal. To
remedy this apparent misspecification, as well as directly test the claims
made by B&D about the relative effectiveness of multilateral and bilateral
aid, I have specified the following regression equation where i denotes the
country and t the time period.
git = α+ β1Yit + β2Maidit + β3Baidit + β4Policyit +
β5Maid× Polit + β6Baid× Polit +E′itβ7 + β8Regioni + γt + it (1)
The primary independent variables of concern are the aid variables, mul-
tilateral aid (Maid) and bilateral aid (Baid), as well as the aid/policy in-
7
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teraction terms Maid × Polit and Baid × Polit. The aid variables consist
of both outright grants and the grant portion of concessional loans made to
recipient countries. These figures are used in standardized 1985 US dollars.
The policy index (Pol) used by B&D was formed by running the growth
regression in equation 1 excluding the aid terms and including three policy
variables to determine the respective weights for these indicators: govern-
ment budget balance, inflation rate, and the Sachs-Warner openness index
(Sachs, et. al. 1995). 2
To control for exogenous shocks that may affect growth, four variables are
included by B&D in the vector of explanatory variables (E). The first of these
four variables is the International Country Risk Guide Economics (ICRGE)
indicator as a proxy for institutional quality and security of property rights
within a country. As a result of limited access, data from 1980 are used
for each country based upon the assumption that institutions are slow to
change. The second is an assassinations per capita variable to account for
political instability within each country. The third is a ethno-linguistic
fractionalization index created by Easterly and Levine (1997). This term,
like the proxy for institutional quality, does not change with time and is
included to reflect “long-term characteristics of countries that affect both
policies and growth” (Burnside and Dollar 850). The final shock variable is
M2 divided by GDP and lagged one period as a proxy for financial institution
development.3
In addition to these variables, the natural logarithm of initial GDP of
the country (Y ) and regional dummies (Region) are also included in the
regression equation. Finally, γt denotes fixed time effects and it is the
random error term.
Beyond the added specification of aid type, equation 1 is identical to that
2For a more detailed discussion on the construction of the policy index see Burnside
and Dollar (2000).
3These dummies are identical to those used in B&D’s specification.
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used by B&D. The equation (1) is augmented, along with sample restric-
tions, to follow the series of specifications utilized by Burnside and Dollar
in their original paper. I demonstrate that my results are robust to multiple
specifications of this model.
It is important to emphasize at this point that the purpose of this re-
search is to test the claims of B&D by using their own data set and only
changing the aid variable in their regression equation. The remaining vari-
ables and techniques remain identical to those used by B&D in their own
research.
2.2 Hypotheses and Method
My primary goal is to directly test the claim made by B&D that the lack
of positive correlation between growth and total aid can be attributed to
the lack of correlation or negative correlation between growth and bilateral
aid. Their conclusion is based on two implicit assumptions which I test
explicitly. The first is that the coefficient on multilateral aid should be
positive (β2 > 0) indicating the positive relationship between multilateral
aid receipts and GDP growth and the coefficient on bilateral aid is not
statistically different from zero (β3 = 0). The second hypothesis tests B&D’s
claim that multilateral aid is more effective than bilateral aid at stimulating
economic growth (β2 > β3).
While the endogenaity of aid may seem to be an issue, a number of
studies have demonstrated that ordinary least-squared estimates (OLS) do
not produce significantly different coefficients than estimatesgenerated using
simultaneous equation techniques including two-stage least squares. As a
result of the series of papers which confirm this result (Burnside and Dollar
(2000), Ram (2003) and Hansen and Tarp (2001)) this research has been
limited to OLS regressions.4
4As is done by B&D, I use heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors as proposed
by White (1980).
9
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Name Mean Median Standard Deviation
Multilateral Aid 0.43 0.15 0.68
Bilateral Aid 1.00 0.58 1.10
Policy Index 1.16 0.94 1.16
3 Results
By using the same data and methodology as Burnside and Dollar, the results
presented in Section 4.1 below demonstrate that the data do not support the
claim that multilateral aid is more effective than bilateral aid at increasing
GDP growth in low- and middle-income countries. After these results have
been demonstrated to be robust to all of the various subsamples and specifi-
cations used by B&D, I examine implications of these results by identifying
the marginal effect of multilateral aid on economic growth at several policy
levels.
3.1 Differentiating Aid Types
The data provided by Burnside and Dollar do not support either of the
hypotheses outlined in Section 3.2. As can be seen in Table 2 (1), the initial
results indicate the exact opposite. Using the standard regression equation
1, the coefficient on multilateral aid (β2) is significantly negative and the
coefficient on bilateral aid (β3) is significantly positive. For comparison, I
have reproduced and provide B&D’s results along side my own.
This result is maintained when the quadratic interaction terms are added
to the equation (as seen in Table 2 (2)). In this regression, β2 is -0.92
while the coefficient on bilateral aid (β3) is 0.44. Both of these results call
into question Burnside and Dollar’s conclusion that the positive correlation
between aid and GDP growth was watered down by the roughly 23 of total aid
that was given bilaterally. It appears, from these results, that the positive
10
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correlation between total aid and growth is actually being diminished by the
presence of multilateral aid.
As can be seen in Table 3, these results are robust to a limited sam-
ple size of low-income countries. In all of these regressions, the coefficient
on multilateral aid remains negative and the coefficient on bilateral aid is
positive. Also, for every regression except for (3), these results are statis-
tically significant. In addition, Table 4 demonstrates that these results are
even robust to the removal of five outlying observations.5 Regressions (5)
and (6) have excluded outlying observations, while (7) and (8) also exclude
middle-income countries. In all specifications the coefficient on multilateral
aid remains significantly negative, while the sign on bilateral aid is posi-
tive (and significant in the regression which includes both low and middle-
income countries).
To be sure that the inclusion of two different regressors for aid is appro-
priate, I ran an F-test to gauge for statistical equality. I find that in every
instance there is reason to doubt that the two coefficients are statistically
identical. In almost all instances, the F-test indicates significant reason to
reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on multilateral aid is equal to the
coefficient on bilateral aid.6
3.2 Policy Levels
While the results presented in the previous section provide a fairly com-
pelling case that, on average, multilateral aid has a directly negative impact
on GDP growth in the recipient country, this section will provide greater
insight into how the interaction between policy and multilateral aid affects
the growth prospects for a receiving country. B&D’s central thesis empha-
sises the importance of what they define as ‘good’ policies in determining
5The following outlying observations identified by B&D are excluded in regressions 5-8:
Gambia (1986-89), (1990-93), Guyana (1990-93), Nicaragua (1986-89), and (1990-93)
6The results for regression 8 indicate likely difference, but are not statistically signifi-
cant
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Table 2: The Impact of Differentiated Aid Variables
git = α+ β1Yit + β2Maidit + β3Baidit + β4Policyit + β5Maid× Polit
+β6Baid× Polit +E′itβ7 + β8Regioni + β9Maid2 × Polit + β10Baid2 × Polit + γt + it
(1) (2)
Variable Name B&D -Author- B&D -Author-
Initial GDP -0.60 -0.73 -0.56 -0.83
(0.57) (0.57) (0.56) (0.57)
Ethnic fractionalization -0.42 -0.48 -0.42 -0.54
(0.72) (0.74) (0.73) (0.74)
Assassinations -0.45* -0.49* -0.45* -0.50*
(0.26) (.27) (0.26) (0.27)
Ethnic fractionalization x Assassinations 0.79* 0.87** 0.80* 0.90**
(0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.45)
Institutional Quality 0.69** 0.67** 0.67** 0.71**
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
M2/GDP (Lagged) 0.012 0.013 0.016 0.003
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.87** -1.82** -1.84** -1.81**
(0.75) (0.76) (0.74) (0.77)
East Asia 1.31** 1.05* 1.20** 1.10*
(0.58) (0.60) (0.58) (0.60)
Policy Index 0.71** 0.88** 0.78** 0.80**
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21)
Aid/GDP -0.021 0.49
(0.16) (0.12)
(Aid/GDP) x Policy 0.19** 0.20**
(0.07) (0.09)
(Aid/GDP)2 x Policy -0.019**
(0.0084)
MAid/GDP -0.80* -0.92**
(0.41) (0.41)
(MAid/GDP) x Policy 0.11 -0.46
(0.23) (0.38)
BAid/GDP 0.42* 0.44**
(0.23) (0.22)
(BAid/GDP) x Policy 0.05 0.39**
(0.10) (0.20)
(MAid/GDP)2 x Policy 0.08*
(0.05)
(BAid/GDP)2 x Policy -0.04
(0.03)
Observations 270 275 275 275
R2 0.36 0.41 0.36 0.41
Statistical Significance: **=.05 and *=.10
The number of observations in the two results shown in (1) differ because B&D
exclude five outlying observations. These same observations are excluded in Table 4 (5).
Results correspond to B&D (2000) Table 4
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Table 3: Low-Income Country Subsample
git = α+ β1Yit + β2Maidit + β3Baidit + β4Policyit + β5Maid× Polit
+β6Baid× Polit +E′itβ7 + β8Regioni + β9Maid2 × Polit + β10Baid2 × Polit + γt + it
(3) (4)
Variable Name B&D -Author- B&D -Author-
Initial GDP -0.72 -0.93 -0.60 -0.97
(0.81) (0.84) (0.79) (0.85)
Ethnic fractionalization -0.58 -0.79 -0.56 -0.83
(0.80) (0.84) (0.80) (0.85)
Assassinations -0.79* -0.88** -0.84* -0.94**
(0.44) (0.45) (0.43) (0.42)
Ethnic fractionalization x Assassinations 0.69 1.08 0.88 1.05
(0.91) (0.92) (0.90) (0.92)
Institutional Quality 0.84** 0.75** 0.80** 0.82**
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21)
M2/GDP (Lagged) 0.024 0.03* 0.031* 0.02
(0.017) (0.02) (0.017) (0.02)
Sub-Saharan Africa -2.24** -2.02** -2.20** -2.13**
(0.67) (0.69) (0.67) (0.70)
East Asia 1.54** 0.86 1.33* 1.20
(0.67) (0.71) (0.71) (0.78)
Policy Index 0.56* 1.06** 0.74** 0.76*
(0.31) (0.33) (0.35) (0.40)
Aid/GDP -0.18 -0.013
(0.17) (0.13)
(Aid/GDP) x Policy 0.26** 0.27**
(0.08) (0.12)
(Aid/GDP)2 x Policy -0.024**
(0.0093)
MAid/GDP -0.62 -0.78*
(0.43) (0.43)
(MAid/GDP) x Policy 0.07 -0.29
(0.22) (0.37)
BAid/GDP 0.26 0.25
(0.23) (0.21)
(BAid/GDP) x Policy 0.035 0.51**
(0.11) (0.22)
(MAid/GDP)2 x Policy 0.06
(0.04)
(BAid/GDP)2 x Policy -0.07**
(0.03)
Observations 189 189 189 189
R2 0.42 0.47 0.42 0.48
Statistical Significance: **=.05 and *=.10
Results correspond to B&D (2000) Table 5
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Table 4: Excluding Outliers
git = α+ β1Yit + β2Maidit + β3Baidit + β4Policyit + β5Maid× Polit
+β6Baid× Polit +E′itβ7 + β8Regioni + β9Maid2 × Polit + β10Baid2 × Polit + γt + it
Variable Name (5) (6) (7) (8)
Initial GDP -0.78 -0.98 -0.91 -1.21
(0.57) (0.57) (0.86) (0.85)
Ethnic fractionalization -0.44 -0.57 -0.68 -0.87
(0.74) (0.72) (0.83) (0.81)
Assassinations -0.50* -0.52** -0.91** -0.81*
(0.27) (0.27) (0.42) (0.45)
Ethnic fractionalization x Assassinations 0.89** 0.92** 0.90 0.90
(0.44) (0.44) (0.93) (0.91)
Institutional Quality 0.75** 0.67** 0.86** 0.78**
(0.17) (0.17) (0.21) (0.21)
M2/GDP (Lagged) 0.002 0.0002 0.017 0.016
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Sub-Saharan Africa -2.05** -1.88** -2.37** -2.20**
(0.77) (0.75) (0.70) (0.69)
East Asia 1.34** 1.02** 1.60** 0.90
(0.60) (0.58) (0.72) (0.74)
Policy Index 0.69** 0.98** 0.56** 1.05**
(0.19) (0.21) (0.32) (0.39)
MAid/GDP -1.34** -1.86** -1.16** -1.53**
(0.41) (0.50) (0.41) (0.50)
(MAid/GDP) x Policy 0.41* 0.12 0.50* 0.27
(0.23) (0.40) (0.27) (0.44)
BAid/GDP 0.68** 0.75** 0.37 0.45
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
(BAid/GDP) x Policy 0.06 -0.65** 0.14 -0.61
(0.12) (0.33) (0.13) (0.44)
(MAid/GDP)2 x Policy 0.22 0.16
(0.14) (0.14)
(BAid/GDP)2 x Policy 0.18** 0.17**
(0.06) (0.08)
Observations 270 270 184 184
R2 0.41 0.43 0.49 0.50
Statistical Significance: **=.05 and *=.10
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Table 5: Impact of Multilateral Aid on Growth with Given Policy
Minimum Policy
Regression Equation Policy = 1.2 Policy = 2.4 for Positive Relationship
(1) Full Sample -0.67 -0.54 7.27
(3) Low-Income -0.54 -0.46 8.86
(5) Outliers Excluded -0.85 -0.36 3.27
(7) Low-Income
Outliers Excluded -0.56 0.05 2.32
not only the effectiveness of aid, but also the distribution of aid. They find
that multilateral aid is more likely to be distributed to countries with good
policies, while bilateral aid is not. This is just one of the pieces of evidence
they invoke in order to make their claim that multilateral aid is better at
spurring growth than bilateral aid.
While B&D’s policy index does make it somewhat difficult to assess what
the policy requirements are for aid to be effective, they define one standard
deviation above the mean (a policy index of 2.4) as the threshold for a
‘good’ policy level. With this in mind, Table 5 gives further context to the
earlier regression results demonstrating the marginal effect of multilateral
aid at the average level of policy (see Table 1 for summary statistics), at
the threshold for a ‘good’ policy environment, as well as what level of policy
would be necessary for multilateral aid to have a positive effect on GDP
growth. These results demonstrate the practical signficance of the negative
coefficient on multilateral aid in all eight regressions. The median value for
policy in this data set is 0.94 with a maximum value of 3.61. It is clear
that in almost every case, the multilateral aid included in this data set has
a negative effect on GDP growth.
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4 Conclusions
These results demonstrate that the data used by B&D do not support all
of their claims. The inclusion of differentiated aid regressors reveals that
multilateral aid is not only less effective, but also has a negative direct effect
on GDP growth. These results are robust to both the exclusion of outliers
as well as a limited, low-income subsample.
While further research is necessary to provide a solid explanation as to
why these results exist, there are several possibilities. One possibility posed
by Easterly (2003) is that there is a fundamental flaw in the assumptions on
which the growth models are built. This is plausible, but would require a
much more thorough investigation into the nature of economic growth in de-
veloping economies. A second possibility is that multilateral aid is effective
over a longer period of time. While this hypothesis provides a foundation
for future research, the data set used for this paper already accounts for po-
tential lags by averaging growth over four-year periods. A third, connected
explanation is that the policy changes that are enforced by multilateral aid
agencies actually constrict growth in the short to medium-term. This expla-
nation seems best supported by the negative coefficient on multilateral aid
and the positive coefficient on the interaction term (multilateral × policy).
In a country with already ‘good’ policies, there are less severe contingencies
placed on the multilateral aid.
While there are a number of possible explanations for these results, there
is one clear conclusion that can be drawn–these results do not support the
claim made by Burnside and Dollar (2000) that multilateral aid is more
effective at producing GDP growth than bilateral aid. From these results,
bilateral aid, despite its connection with increased consumption, appears to
be the most effective of the two forms of aid at producing GDP growth in
the short- to medium-term.
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